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This Article focuses on the interaction between uncertainty and insurability 
in the context of some of the risks associated with climate change.  It discusses 
the evolution of insured losses due to weather-related disasters over the past 
decade and the key drivers of the sharp increases in both economic and insured 
catastrophe losses over the past twenty years.  In particular, the authors 
examine the impact of development in hazard-prone areas and of global 
warming on the potential for catastrophic losses in the future.  In this context, 
the authors discuss the implications for insurance risk capital and the capacity 
of the insurance industry to handle large-scale events.  A key question that 
needs to be addressed is which factors determine the insurability of a risk and 
the extent of coverage offered by the private sector to provide protection against 
extreme events when there is significant uncertainty surrounding the probability 
and consequences of a catastrophic loss.  The authors further discuss the 
concepts of insurability by focusing on coverage for natural hazards, such as 
earthquakes, hurricanes, and floods.  The Article also focuses on the liability 
issues associated with global climate change and possible implications for 
insurers, including issuers of Directors’ and Officers’ policies, given the 
difficulty in identifying potential defendants, tracing harm to their actions, 
and apportioning damages among them.  The Article concludes by suggesting 
ways that insurers can help mitigate future damages from global climate 
change by providing premium reductions and rate credits to companies 
investing in risk-reducing measures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The World Economic Forum recently stated that climate change is 
one of the most important global risks that key decision makers will 
face in the years to come.1  In the same vein, a report commissioned 
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the United Kingdom echoes 
this perspective and notes that “climate change presents very serious 
global risks, and it demands an urgent global response.” 2  The Stern 
Review notes that global climate change “presents a unique challenge 
for economics” due to the long time horizons involved, the uncer-
tainty associated with the risk, and the unprecedented scale on which 
one needs to envision such a problem.3  These points reinforce the 
common sentiment that we need to address the role of different in-
dustrial sectors in reducing the impacts of global warming. 
This Article focuses on the role that the insurance sector can play 
in this regard and the challenges insurers and reinsurers face in deal-
ing with the impact of climate change on their risk management 
strategies.  Indeed, the direct and indirect impact of firms’ activities to 
limit future emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and to adapt in 
other ways to climate change is likely to have major implications on 
the insurance sector.  In a recent interview, John Coomber, former 
CEO of the Swiss Reinsurance Co. (Swiss Re), a world reinsurance 
leader, stated that climate change “is the number one risk in the 
world ahead of terrorism, demographic change and other global risk 
scenarios . . . .” 4  In May 2006, American International Group (AIG), 
the largest insurer in the United States, issued a statement that 
“[c]limate change is increasingly recognized as an ongoing, significant 
global environmental problem with potential risks to the global econ-
omy and ecology, and to human health and wellbeing.” 5
1 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, GLOBAL RISKS 2007, at 4 (2007), available at http:// 
www.weforum.org/pdf/CSI/Global_Risks_2007.pdf. 
2 NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW:  THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE i 
(2007).  A prepublication version of the Stern Review is available at http:// 
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/indepenent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/ 
stern_review_report.cfm. 
3 Id. 
4 Climate Group Interview with John Coomber, former CEO of Swiss Rein-
surance Co., available at http://www.swissre.com/internet/pwswpspr.nsf/ 
fmBookMarkFrameSet?ReadForm&BM=../vwAllbyIDKeyLu/rscd-6necs4?OpenDocument 
(last visited May 1, 2007). 
5 AM. INT’L GROUP, AIG’S POLICY AND PROGRAMS ON ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE 1 (2006), available at http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/76/ 
76115/aig_climate_change_updated.pdf; see also AIG Adopts Policy on Climate Change, 
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Extreme-weather-related events (such as hurricanes, floods, and ice 
storms) will impact the premiums and available coverage for property 
damage and business interruption losses.  They may affect health and 
life insurance as well.  Because insurance policies are usually renewed 
annually, insurers are faced with the problem of how to set premiums 
and what coverage to offer in the coming year.  This can be a difficult 
challenge, given the inability to distinguish between random weather 
patterns and systematic changes in climate in the short run. 
Insurers have also begun paying attention to the liability issues as-
sociated with climate change because shareholders could accuse some 
companies of failing to prepare for climate-related financial expo-
sures.  To the extent that shareholders take such cases to court, insur-
ers have to defend those firms who have purchased Directors’ and Of-
ficers’ (D&O) liability coverage from them. 
The Article is organized as follows.  Part I discusses the evolution 
of catastrophic losses over the past twenty years.  In particular, we ex-
amine the impact of climate change, coupled with the development of 
hazard-prone areas, on the potential for large losses to insurers in the 
near future.  In this context we discuss the capacity of the insurance 
industry to handle large-scale disasters without assistance from the 
public sector.  Part II addresses the issue of attribution by examining 
the main drivers of this new dimension of catastrophic losses.  While 
climate change may impact the intensity and frequency of future hur-
ricanes, the growing concentration of population and industry in 
high-risk areas is largely responsible for the billions of dollars in losses 
that will result from such events. 
Part III discusses the concept of insurability by focusing on cover-
age for natural hazards—such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and 
floods—and showing how these extreme events impact whether these 
hazards are insurable by the private sector alone (and, if so, under 
what market conditions).  The seven major hurricanes that devastated 
Florida in 2004 and the Gulf Coast in 2005 served as a wake-up call 
not only to insurers and reinsurers, but to other stakeholders as well.  
Among these stakeholders are modeling firms that have developed 
and revised catastrophe models for quantifying insurers’ and reinsur-
ers’ exposure, rating agencies that have modified their rating meth-
odologies and imposed more stringent conditions of catastrophe ex-
posure management by insurers and reinsurers, and investors who 
INS. J., May 17, 2006, available at http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/ 
international/2006/05/17/68491.htm. 
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now require a higher return on equity to reflect the higher volatility of 
insurers’ portfolios, due to the new scale of extreme events.  Part IV 
then demonstrates how these stakeholders are modifying the frontier 
of the insurability of catastrophic risks. 
Part V focuses on another challenge that will face the insurance 
sector in the coming years:  the liability issues associated with global 
climate change given the difficulty in identifying potential defendants, 
tracing harm caused by their actions, and apportioning damages be-
tween them.  We also suggest ways that insurers can help mitigate fu-
ture damages from global climate change by providing premium re-
ductions and rate credits to companies that have taken actions that 
produce short-run tangible benefits and have a long-run positive im-
pact on global climate change.  Part VI provides a brief summary of 
our findings and issues a call for a more systematic collection of data 
to allow well-informed strategies and policies. 
I.  CHANGES IN EXTREME-WEATHER-RELATED EVENTS 
Catastrophes have had a more devastating impact on insurers over 
the past fifteen years than in their entire history.  Between 1970 and the 
mid-1980s, annual insured losses from natural disasters (including for-
est fires) were in the $3 to $4 billion range.  The insured losses from 
Hurricane Hugo, which made landfall in Charleston, South Carolina 
on September 22, 1989, exceeded $4 billion (in 1989 values).  It was the 
first natural disaster in the United States to inflict more than $1 billion 
of insured losses.  In the 1990s, the scale of insured losses from major 
natural disasters changed radically:  it grew to $17 billion in 1991, 
greater than $30 billion in 1992 (with $20 billion from Hurricane An-
drew alone), more than $20 billion in 1994 (with $18 billion from the 
Northridge earthquake alone), and $25 billion in 1999 (mainly due to 
major storms and floods in Europe). 
 Damages reached a new record in 2004 with total financial losses of 
$123 billion from natural disasters throughout the world.  Insurance 
covered $49 billion of these losses.6  This upward trend is continuing.  
In 2005, insured losses from Hurricane Katrina alone are estimated at 
6 SWISS REINSURANCE CO., SIGMA, NO. 1, NATURAL CATASTROPHES AND MAN-MADE 
DISASTERS IN 2004, at 3 (2005), available at http://www.swissre.com/ 
Internet/pwsfilpr.nsf/vwFilebyIDKEYLu/MPDL-6A2D64/$FILE/sigma1_2005_e.pdf. 
7
 SWISS REINSURANCE CO., SIGMA, NO. 2, NATURAL CATASTROPHES AND MAN-MADE 
DISASTERS 2005 (2006), at 3, available at http://www.swissre.com/Internet/ 
pwsfilpr.nsf/vwFilebyIDKEYLu/EWAL-6MBJQ2/$FILE/Sigma2_2006_e.pdf. 
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$45 billion.7  Worldwide major catastrophes in 2005 inflicted $230 bil-
lion in economic damage, $83 billion of which was covered by insur-
ance.8  Figure 1 depicts the upward trend in worldwide insured losses 
from catastrophes between 1970 and 2005 in 2005-indexed prices.9
 
Figure 1:  Worldwide Evolution of Catastrophe Insured Losses, 1970-200510
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8 Id. 
9 There is a growing literature studying the evolution of insured losses due to ma-
jor catastrophes in the world.  Total figures differ from one source to another, mainly 
due to divergent definitions of a “catastrophe,” yet all reach the same conclusion.  For 
example, natural disasters inflicting insured losses above $38.7 million or total losses 
above $77.5 million are considered a major catastrophe by Swiss Re (we use this 
threshold in Figure 1).  Id. at 38.  Munich Re uses a higher threshold.  As a result, most 
figures used in the literature regarding the evolution of catastrophe losses underesti-
mate the real effect on insurers.  In the United States, for example, Property Claim 
Services (PCS) defines a “catastrophe” as an event that inflicts insured losses above $25 
million; smaller events (even those that are repeated) are not included in the PCS ca-
tastrophe database.  See ISO Props., Inc., PCS Catastrophe Serial Numbers, http:// 
www.iso.com/products/2800/prod2802.html (last visited May 1, 2007) (“PCS now de-
fines catastrophes as events that cause $25 million or more in direct insured losses to 
property and that affect a significant number of policyholders and insurers.”).  None-
theless, all studies of which we are aware conclude that insured catastrophe losses have 
rapidly increased in recent years. 
10 This figure is indexed to 2005 dollars.  September 11, 2001 insured losses in-
clude property and business interruption.  See Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan & Howard C. 
Kunreuther, Improving Homeland Security in the Wake of Large-Scale Disasters:  
Would Risk-Based All-Hazard Disaster Insurance Help in the Post-Katrina World?, at 
slide 7 (Aug. 18-19, 2006), available at http://www.usc.edu/dept/create/assets/ 
003/51953.pdf.  These data are from the Wharton Risk Center, Swiss Re, and the In-
surance Information Institute. 
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 Table 1 shows the twenty most costly catastrophes for the insurance 
sector over the past thirty-five years in 2005 dollars.  With the exception 
of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, all of the most costly 
events were natural disasters.11  Among these natural disasters, more 
than 80% were weather-related events:  hurricanes and typhoons, 
storms, and floods constituted nearly three-quarters of the claims ema-
nating from the United States.  The era we have now entered is best il-
lustrated by data showing that of the twenty most costly events over this 
thirty- five-year period, ten occurred during the past five years. 
The insured losses from Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the 
Northridge earthquake in 1994 led insurers and reinsurers to pay 
much more attention to the catastrophic potential of natural disasters.  
These two events, considered the first two “super-catastrophes” (insur-
ance losses above $10 billion), caused insurers to reflect on what con-
stitutes an insurable risk.  To assist them in making this determina-
tion, many firms began utilizing catastrophe models to estimate the 
likelihood and consequences of specific disasters in hazard-prone ar-
eas to their insured portfolios.12
 
11 The two most costly industrial catastrophes in regards to insurance claims over 
this thirty-five-year period are the explosion of the offshore oil platform Piper Alfa in 
the United Kingdom in July 1988, which cost about $3.2 billion to insurers, and the 
explosion of a petrochemical plant in the United States in October 1989, which in-
flicted insured damage of $2 billion (in 2004 dollars).  SWISS REINSURANCE CO. 2004, 
supra note 6, at 34 tbl.9. 
12 CATASTROPHE MODELING:  A NEW APPROACH TO MANAGING RISK 25 (Patricia 
Grossi & Howard Kunreuther eds., 2005). 
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Table 1:  The Twenty Most Costly Insured Catastrophes  
in the World, 1970-2005 13
 
 
Rank 
U.S. $ Bil. 
(indexed to 
2005) 
Event 
Victims 
(Dead or 
Missing) 
Year 
Area of Primary  
Damage 
1 45* Hurricane 
Katrina 
1326 2005 United States, Gulf of 
Mexico, etc. 
2 35 9/11 Attacks  3025 2001 United States 
 
3 22.3 Hurricane  
Andrew 
43 1992 United States, Bahamas 
4 18.5 Northridge 
earthquake 
61 1994 United States 
5 11.7 Hurricane Ivan 124 2004 United States, Carib-
bean, etc. 
6 10.3 Hurricane 
Wilma 
35 2005 United States, Gulf of 
Mexico, etc. 
7 8.3 Hurricane  
Charley 
24 2004 United States, Carib-
bean, etc. 
8 8.1 Typhoon 
Mireille 
51 1991 Japan 
9 6.9 Winterstorm 
Daria 
95 1990 France, United King-
dom, etc. 
10 6.8 Winterstorm 
Lothar 
110 1999 France, Switzerland, 
etc. 
11 6.6 Hurricane Hugo 71 1989 Puerto Rico, United 
States, etc. 
12 5.2 Hurricane  
Frances 
38 2004 United States, Bahamas 
13 5.2 Storms and 
floods 
22 1987 France, United King-
dom, etc. 
14 5.0* Hurricane Rita 34 2005 United States, Gulf of 
Mexico, etc. 
15 4.8 Winterstorm 
Vivian 
64 1990 Western & Central 
Europe 
16 4.7 Typhoon Bart 26 1999 Japan 
 
17 4.2 Hurricane  
Georges 
600 1998 United States, Carib-
bean 
18 4.1 Hurricane 
Jeanne 
3034 2004 United States, Carib-
bean, etc. 
19 3.7 Typhoon Songda 45 2004 Japan, South Korea 
 
20 3.5 Tropical Storm 
Allison 
41 2001 United States 
 
13 Disasters that occurred between 2001 and 2005 are shaded in gray.  See WHAR-
TON RISK CENTER, MANAGING LARGE-SCALE RISKS IN A NEW ERA OF CATASTROPHES:  
REPORT ON PHASE I OF THE STUDY 5 tbl.1.1 (2007), available at http:// 
opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/Report_on_Phase_I.pdf.  Data are from the 
Wharton Risk Center, Swiss Re, and the Insurance Information Institute.  Asterisks in-
dicate that the figure excludes $2 to $3 billion in offshore energy losses. 
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A.  Insured Versus Economic Impact 
Insurance does not decrease the global losses from an untoward 
event, but rather spreads its financial impact by enabling those at risk 
to pay a relatively small premium so that they can be protected against 
a large loss that has a small chance of occurring.  Hence, insured 
losses reflect only a part of the total economic damage inflicted by a 
disaster.  By definition, the ratio of economic losses to insured losses 
(L/I) will be very high when there is a limited insurance market, as is 
often the case in developing countries.  For example, in 1996, major 
floods in China inflicted about $24 billion in economic loss, less than 
$500 million of which was covered by insurance, leading to an L/I ra-
tio of approximately fifty.  Two years later, in 1998, other floods in 
China cost about $30 billion in direct economic loss, but only $1 bil-
lion was covered by insurance, leading to an L/I ratio of thirty.  High 
L/I ratios have also been observed in industrialized countries in which 
there are no minimum insurance requirements.  For example, the 
large-scale earthquake that devastated Kobe, Japan in 1995 cost $110 
billion (L), only $3 billion of which was covered by insurance (I). 
Traditionally, there has been a much lower L/I ratio in the U.S. 
market, ranging from two to four, principally because banks and fi-
nancial institutions often make insurance a condition for a mortgage 
and because of the use of effective mitigation measures for reducing 
losses from natural disasters.  In the cases of Hurricane Andrew and 
the Northridge earthquake, the L/I ratio was about 1.5 (26/17) and 
2.8 (44/15.5), respectively, with both L and I specified in billions of 
dollars.  For Hurricane Katrina, the ratio is estimated to be in the 
three-to-four range [(150-170)/45].14
Figure 2 compares economic loss and insured losses for “great 
natural disasters” from 1960-2004.  Economic losses follow the same 
increasing trend described earlier for insured losses.  The light gray 
multiyear rectangles in the graph represent the average annual eco-
nomic loss by decade (in 2004 values).  A comparison of these eco-
nomic losses over time reveals a huge increase:  $44.9 billion (1950-
1959); $80.5 billion (1960-1969); $147.6 billion (1970-1980); $228 bil-
lion (1980-1989); and $703.6 billion (1990-1999).  While the eco-
nomic losses during the first four years of the twenty-first century 
(2000-2003) were less severe than losses in previous years, disasters in 
2004 inflicted about $113 billion in economic loss, making it the sec-
14 Total economic losses due to Hurricane Katrina are still not definitive. 
  
2007] CLIMATE CHANGE, INSURABILITY, AND LIABILITY 1803 
ond most devastating year of this forty- four-year period.15  And disas-
ters in 2005 alone inflicted twice as much economic loss as in 2004. 
 
Figure 2:  Evolution of “Great Natural Catastrophes” from 1960-2004:   
Economic Versus Insured Impact 16
 
 
B.  Economic Versus Human Impacts 
Fatalities often do not factor into insurance loss rankings.  The 
correlation between insured losses and fatalities is even less clear than 
the relationship between insured and economic losses, as a large 
 
15 MUNICH RE GROUP, TOPICS GEO 2004 14-15 (2005), available at http:// 
www.munichre.com/publications/302-04321_en.pdf?rdm?457. 
16 Dataset obtained from Munich Re.  As discussed in note 9 supra, figures differ 
from one source to another.  Munich Re and Swiss Re, the two leading reinsurers in 
the world, do not use the same definition of catastrophe.  Typically, Munich Re’s esti-
mates are lower than Swiss Re’s, the former selecting only very large natural catastro-
phes, whereas the latter is less restrictive in its definition.  These differences can be 
very important.  For example, when Munich Re estimated insured loss at about $35 
billion in 2004, Swiss Re’s estimate was $49 billion.  More generally, the Swiss Re and 
Munich Re data underestimate the actual total cost of natural disasters.  However, they 
also constitute the most extensive (both in time and in scale) approximation of that 
sort. 
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number of natural disasters occur in the developing world or in poor 
areas of developed countries where there is limited insurance in place.  
For example, the tsunami that devastated South Asia in December 
2004 cost the insurance industry about $5 billion, primarily from 
losses to tourism activities, but the disaster killed over 280,000 people 
and constitutes the second most deadly natural disaster event over the 
past 100 years (a 1972 storm and flood killed almost 300,000 people in 
Bangladesh).  More generally, the most deadly natural disasters, from 
the point of view of lives lost, occur in developing countries.  Between 
1970 and 2004, twenty catastrophes each killed over 10,000 people, 
with all but one (the Izmit earthquake in Turkey in 1999) occurring in 
non-OECD17 countries.18
II.  THE QUESTION OF ATTRIBUTION:   
A FOCUS ON WEATHER-RELATED EVENTS 
In the preceding section, we discussed natural disasters without 
differentiating between weather-related events (e.g., storms, floods, 
droughts, heat waves, cold, and frost) and non-weather-related events 
(e.g., earthquakes).  With respect to the relationship between climate 
change and insurance, it is important to focus on weather-related 
events.19
Between 1970 and 2004, storms and floods were responsible for 
over 90% of the total economic costs of extreme weather-related 
events.  Storms (hurricanes in the U.S. region, typhoons in the Japan 
region, and windstorms in Europe) account for 75% of insured losses.  
Floods represent about 10%.  According to a recent study by the Asso-
ciation of British Insurers (ABI), in every year since 1990 there have 
been at least twenty weather-related events that were severe enough to 
be classified by leading reinsurers as significant catastrophes.  In con-
17 OECD, which stands for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment, is an international organization in which the thirty members, democratic 
countries in the world with the highest income, brainstorm ways to address the issues 
surrounding globalization.  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment, http://www.oecd.org (last visited May 1, 2007). 
18
 SWISS REINSURANCE CO. 2004, supra note 6, at 35. 
19 Earthquakes are a major source of catastrophes as well.  While not related to 
climate change, they can also seriously affect insurance capacity.  A major earthquake 
in California today would be economically devastating and have a large impact on how 
the insurance industry could handle future catastrophes, including weather-related 
ones.  A major earthquake in Tokyo could inflict economic losses at the trillion dollar 
level, with a critical impact on financial markets worldwide, and even lead to a reces-
sion. 
  
2007] CLIMATE CHANGE, INSURABILITY, AND LIABILITY 1805 
 
trast, between 1970 and 1990, only three years experienced more than 
twenty such significant catastrophes.  In constant prices, adjusted to 
2004 dollars, insured losses due to weather-related events averaged $3 
billion annually between 1970 and 1990 and then increased signifi-
cantly to $16 billion annually between 1990 and 2004.20  In 2005, 
99.7% of all catastrophe losses worldwide were due to weather-related 
events.21
This raises several questions:  What are the key drivers of the in-
crease in these losses?  More specifically, what role did socioeconomic 
factors play in affecting this trend?  How is a change in climate likely 
to affect the number and severity of catastrophes in the future? 
  A.  The Impact of Socioeconomic Factors on Increased Losses 
At least two principal socioeconomic factors directly influence the 
level of economic losses due to weather-related events:  degree of ur-
banization and value at risk. 
In 1950, approximately 30% of the world’s total population, then 
2.5 billion people, lived in cities.  In 2000, about 50% of the world’s 
population, then 6 billion, resided in urban areas.  Projections by the 
United Nations show that by 2025, that figure will have increased to 
60% of the projected 8.3 billion people in the world.  A direct conse-
quence of this movement is the increasing number of so-called mega-
cities with a population greater than 10 million.  In 1950, New York 
City was the only mega-city.  In 1990, there were twelve such cities.  By 
2015, there are expected to be twenty-six such cities, several of which 
are located in areas highly prone to natural hazards.  Tokyo22 is pro-
jected to lead the way, with an estimated 29 million inhabitants, fol-
lowed by many others, including Shanghai (estimated at 18 million), 
New York (estimated at 17.6 million), and Los Angeles (estimated at 
14.2 million). 
In hazard-prone areas, this urbanization and increase of popula-
tion translate into increased concentration of exposure.  The devel-
20 ASS’N OF BRITISH INSURERS, FINANCIAL RISKS OF CLIMATE CHANGE  
16 (2005), available at http://www.abi.org.uk/Display/File/Child/506/ 
Financial_Risks_of_Climate_Change.pdf. 
21 EVAN MILLS & EUGENE LECOMTE, FROM RISK TO OPPORTUNITY:  HOW INSURERS 
CAN PROACTIVELY AND PROFITABLY MANAGE CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.ceres.org/pub/docs/Ceres_Insurance_Climate_Report_082206.pdf. 
22 Although not weather-related, the experience of the Kobe earthquake in 1995 
highlights the potential for real cataclysms in the Tokyo region.  An even bigger earth-
quake in Greater Tokyo could inflict economic losses in the range of $1 to $3 trillion. 
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opment of Florida is an example.  The population of Florida has in-
creased significantly over the past 50 years:  2.8 million inhabitants in 
1950, 6.8 million in 1970, 13 million in 1990, and a projected 19.3 mil-
lion population in 2010, translating to an increase of nearly 700% 
since 1950.23
The increase in the value exposed to natural hazards amplifies the 
potential for severe economic and insured losses.  If Hurricane An-
drew had occurred in 2002 rather than 1992, it would have inflicted 
twice the economic losses, principally due to increasing coastal devel-
opment and rising asset values in Miami-Dade County and the adjoin-
ing coastal areas affected by the storm.24
Florida also has a very high density of insurance coverage, with 
almost all houses insured against hurricanes by private insurers and 
about one-third of residences insured against floods under the U.S. 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP),25 according to a study un-
dertaken several years ago by Munich Re.26  The modeling firm AIR 
Worldwide estimates that nearly 80% of insured assets in Florida today 
are located near the coasts, the high risk area in the state.  In real 
terms this represents a huge amount of exposure:  $1.9 trillion of 
commercial and residential property located in coastal areas.27  Insur-
ance density is thus another critical socioeconomic factor to consider 
when evaluating the evolution of insured losses due to weather-related 
catastrophes. 
23 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, RESIDENT POPULATION AND APPORTIONMENT OF 
THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:  FLORIDA 1 (2000), available at www.census.gov/ 
dmd/www/resapport/states/florida.pdf; OFFICE OF ECON. & DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH, 
THE FLA. LEGISLATURE, FLORIDA DEMOGRAPHIC SUMMARY, available at 
http://edr.state.fl.us/population/popsummary.pdf. 
24 Andrew Dlugolecki, Thoughts About the Impact of Climate Change on Insurance 
Claims, in WORKSHOP ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISASTER LOSSES:  UNDERSTANDING 
AND ATTRIBUTING TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS 54, 66 (Peter Höppe & Roger Pielke, Jr. 
eds., 2006), available at http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/sparc/research/projects/ 
extreme_events/munich_workshop/full_workshop_report.pdf. 
25 The NFIP is a public insurance program created in 1968, in which insurers play 
the role of intermediaries between the policyholders and the federal government.  Fol-
lowing Hurricane Katrina, the program had to borrow $20 billion from the federal 
government in 2006 to meet its claims.  Congress is considering substantially modifying 
the program. 
26 MUNICH RE GROUP, TOPICS 2000:  NATURAL CATASTROPHES—THE CURRENT PO-
SITION 91 (1999). 
27 Robert P. Hartwig, Ins. Info. Inst., Hurricane Season of 2005:  Impacts on U.S. 
P/C Insurance Markets in 2006 & Beyond, at slide 53 (Mar. 2006) available at 
http://server.iii.org/yy_obj_data/binary/744082_1_0/katrina.ppt. 
  
2007] CLIMATE CHANGE, INSURABILITY, AND LIABILITY 1807 
 
Another example in the United States relates to industrial devel-
opment in the Gulf of Mexico.  The first offshore oil platform was 
built for water depths more than 100 meters in the 1960s.  Today, 
there are numerous such platforms in the Gulf of Mexico and North 
Sea, two regions highly exposed to major storms.  Indeed, 75% of the 
4000 platforms administered by the Minerals Management Service 
were in the path of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, which destroyed a 
large number of them.  Hurricane Katrina shut down an estimated 
95% of crude production and 88% of natural gas output in the Gulf of 
Mexico, thus inflicting major losses covered by business interruption 
insurance.  According to the U.S. Department of Energy, two months 
after Katrina made landfall as a Category 3 hurricane on August 29, 
2005, the shortfall of oil production was still one million barrels per 
day.28  This example suggests that the economic cost and, correspond-
ingly, the size of insurance-claim payments related to business inter-
ruption from future storms could be quite high.29
These factors will continue to have a major impact on the level of 
insured losses from natural catastrophes.  Consequently, there is a 
need for a more granular approach to increase understanding of 
trends in specific areas and the opportunities to reduce losses through 
mitigation measures tailored to these properties.  However, quantify-
ing each of these factors—increased urbanization, inflation, increased 
value at risk, as well as higher density of insurance coverage—at a local 
level remains a challenge. 
B.  Likelihood Versus Intensity 
We now turn to the second question:  how is a change in climate 
likely to affect the number and severity of weather-related catastro-
phes?  One of the expected effects of global warming is an increase in 
hurricane intensity.  Higher ocean temperatures lead to an exponen-
tially higher evaporation rate in the atmosphere, which increases the 
intensity of cyclones and precipitation.  MIT’s Kerry Emanuel recently 
proposed indexing potential hurricane destructiveness to the total 
28 Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Energy Infrastructure:  Coping with Disasters, WHARTON 
RISK MGMT. REV., Fall 2005, at 7, available at http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/ 
review/Fall2005.pdf. 
29 It is fair to say that the impact on the energy infrastructure would have been 
even more devastating had a major hurricane hit a city like Houston, Texas.  Such a 
scenario would result in large-scale property and business interruption losses for oil 
and chemical industry firms and their insurers. 
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dissipation power over the lifetime of the storm.30  He found a large 
increase in power dissipation over the past thirty years and concluded 
that this increase may be due to the fact that “storms have become 
more intense, on the average, and/or have survived at high intensity 
for longer periods of time.” 31  His study also shows that the annual av-
erage storm peak wind speed over the North Atlantic and eastern and 
western North Pacific has increased by 50% over the past thirty years.32
Another study by a group of authors published the same year in-
dicates that the number of Category 4 and 5 hurricanes 33 worldwide 
has nearly doubled over the past thirty- five years.34  In the 1970s, an 
average of approximately ten Category 4 and 5 hurricanes occurred 
annually.  Since 1990, the number of Category 4 and 5 hurricanes has 
averaged eighteen per year.  Focusing only on the North Atlantic (in-
cluding the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico), Category 4 and 5 
hurricanes have increased from sixteen in the period of 1975-1989 to 
twenty-five in the period of 1990-2004 (a 56% increase).  The study 
concludes by stating that 
global data indicate a 30-year trend toward more frequent and intense 
hurricanes . . . . This trend is not inconsistent with recent climate model 
simulations that a doubling of CO2
 may increase the frequency of the 
most intense cyclones, although attribution of the 30-year trends to 
global warming would require a longer global data record and, espe-
cially, a deeper understanding of the role of hurricanes in the general 
circulation of the atmosphere and ocean, even in the present climate 
state.
35
30 Kerry Emanuel, Increasing Destructiveness of Tropical Cyclones over the Past 30 Years, 
436 NATURE 686, 686 (2005). 
31 Id. at 687. 
32 Id. 
33 Category 4 hurricanes have sustained winds from 131 to 155 miles per hour; 
Category 5 systems, such as Hurricane Katrina at its peak over the Gulf of Mexico, have 
sustained winds of 156 mph or more.  See NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE, NATIONAL 
WEATHER SERVICE MANUAL:  TROPICAL CYCLONE DEFINITIONS, 3-4 (2006), available at 
http://www.weather.gov/directives/sym/pd01006004curr.pdf (describing the Saffir-
Simpson Hurricane Scale). 
34 P.J. Webster et al., Changes in Tropical Cyclone Number, Duration, and Intensity in a 
Warming Environment, 309 SCIENCE 1844, 1846 (2005). 
35 Id. at 1846 (footnote omitted).  This significant increase in observed tropical 
cyclone intensities has also been linked to warming sea surface temperatures in an-
other recent study.  See C.D. Hoyos et al., Deconvolution of the Factors Contributing to the 
Increase in Global Hurricane Intensity, 312 SCIENCE 94, 96 (2006) (“The implication of 
these results is that the strong increasing trend in [Category 4 and 5 cyclones] for the 
period 1970-2004 is directly linked to the trend in tropical [sea surface temperature], 
and that other aspects of the tropical environment, although they influence shorter-
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But this is not to say that there is a consensus by scientists on this 
issue.36  In an article published in 2006 in Science magazine, Landsea 
and his coauthors further point out that subjective measurements and 
variable procedures make existing tropical cyclone databases 
insufficiently reliable to detect trends in the frequency of extreme 
cyclones.  They note that “modeling and theoretical studies suggest 
only small anthropogenic changes to tropical cyclone intensity several 
decades into the future” (an increase on the order of 5% near the end 
of the 21st century).37
This conclusion is reinforced in a recent summary of articles on 
global climate change by Patrick Michaels, past president of the 
American Association of State Climatologists.  He notes that all studies 
of hurricane activity that claim a link between human causation and 
the recent spate of hurricanes must also account for the equally active 
period around the mid-twentieth century.38  Studies using data from 
1970 onward begin at a cool point in the hemisphere’s temperature 
history and hence may draw erroneous conclusions regarding global 
climate change and hurricane activity.39
The current debate in the scientific community regarding changes 
in the frequency and intensity of hurricanes and their relationship to 
global climate change is likely to be with us for a long time.  The re-
sults to date do, of course, raise issues for the insurance industry to 
term variations in hurricane intensity, do not contribute significantly to the global 
trend of increasing hurricane intensity.”). 
36 Indeed, a spirited debate persists on this issue.  Compare Christopher W. Land-
sea, Hurricanes and Global Warming, 438 NATURE E11, E11-E12 (2005) (questioning the 
data used in Emanuel, supra note 30, by suggesting that earlier estimates of hurricane 
wind speed may have underestimated the true figures), with Roger Pielke, Jr. et al., Are 
There Trends in Hurricane Destruction?, 438 NATURE E11 (2005) (criticizing the index 
proposed in Emanuel, supra note 30, as a “misleading” indication of destructiveness), 
and Johnny C.L. Chan, Comment on “Changes in Tropical Cyclone Number, Duration, and 
Intensity in a Warming Environment”, 311 SCIENCE 1713b (2006) (questioning the con-
clusion of Webster, supra note 34, instead suggesting that factors such as wind shear 
are responsible for the observed increase in cyclone activity, and determining that “it is 
difficult to conclude that more intense typhoons are likely to occur in a warmer 
world”), and with P.J. Webster et al., Response to Comment on “Changes in Tropical Cyclone 
Number, Duration, and Intensity in a Warming Environment”, 311 SCIENCE 1713c (2006) 
(contending that the factors identified by Chan, supra, such as wind shear and moist 
static energy, are not correlated with hurricane intensity in a statistically significant 
manner). 
37 Christopher W. Landsea et al., Can We Detect Trends in Extreme Tropical Cyclones?, 
313 SCIENCE 452, 452 (2006) (footnotes omitted). 
38 Patrick J. Michaels, Is the Sky Really Falling?  A Review of Recent Global Warming 
Scare Stories, 576 POLICY ANALYSIS 1, 17 (2006). 
39 Id. at 18-19. 
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the extent that an increase in the number of major hurricanes over a 
shorter period of time is likely to translate into a higher number hit-
ting the coasts.40  As discussed above, hurricanes are more likely to 
damage a much larger number of residences and commercial build-
ings today than if a similar storm had occurred in the 1940s.  This 
raises the question of whether major hurricanes in particular are in-
surable, and also whether large-scale disasters in general are insurable, 
a question to which we now turn. 
III.  DEALING WITH UNCERTAIN CATASTROPHIC LOSS:   
THE INSURABILITY CHALLENGE 
Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the Northridge earthquake in 
1994 forced the insurance industry to reconsider its approach to deal-
ing with catastrophes.41  The dramatic increase in economic and in-
sured losses due to weather-related events in the ensuing ten years, 
culminating with the seven major hurricanes that hit the United States 
in 2004 and 2005 and inflicted over $90 billion in insured losses, in-
tensified this trend.  Today, insurers and reinsurers are reexamining 
their ability to provide protection against wind damage from hurri-
canes and are asking whether these events are insurable and, if so, at 
what price. 
To understand the concept of insurability, consider a standard in-
surance policy whereby premiums are paid at the start of a given time 
period to cover losses during this interval (usually a year).  Two condi-
tions must be met before insurance providers are willing to offer cov-
erage against an uncertain event.  The first is that the provider must 
be able to identify, quantify, and estimate the chances of the event oc-
curring and the extent of losses likely to be incurred.  The second 
condition is that the insurer must be able to set premiums for each 
potential customer or class of customers. 
If both conditions are satisfied, a risk is considered to be insur-
able.  However, it still may not be profitable.  In other words, it may be 
impossible to specify a rate for which there is sufficient demand and 
incoming revenue to cover the development, marketing, operating, 
and claims-processing costs of the insurer and still yield a net positive 
profit over a prespecified time horizon.  In such cases, the insurer will 
opt not to offer coverage against this risk. 
40 For more discussion on this issue, see generally Dlugolecki, supra note 24, and 
Evan Mills, Insurance in a Climate of Change, 309 SCIENCE 1040 (2005). 
41 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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The above two conditions are relevant to the climate change de-
bate.  To be clear, insurance does not cover climate change, but does 
cover a series of prespecified perils and causes, some of which could 
occur as a result of climate change or be affected by it. 
A.  Determining Premiums and Coverage:  Basic Concepts 
The insurance business, like any other business, has its own vo-
cabulary.  A policyholder is a person who has purchased insurance.  A 
premium is the amount that a policyholder pays in return for the prom-
ise of a payment from the insurer should she suffer a loss covered by 
her policy.  A claim means that the policyholder is seeking to recover 
financial payments from the insurer for damage covered by the policy.  
A claim will not result in a payment by the insurer if the amount of 
the insured’s financial loss is below the stated deductible (i.e., the 
amount or proportion of an insured loss that the policyholder agrees 
to pay before any recovery from the insurer) or if the loss is subject to 
policy exclusions (e.g., war or insurrection).  However, insurers will 
still incur expenses in investigating the claim. 
Insurer capital represents the net worth of the company (assets 
minus liabilities).  Capital enables the insurer to pay any losses above 
those that were expected.  It serves as a safety net to support the risk 
that an insurer takes on by writing insurance and helps to ensure that 
the insurer will be able to honor its contracts.  As such, it supports the 
personal safety nets of homeowners, business owners, workers, de-
pendents of heads of households, and others who rely on insurance to 
provide financial compensation to rebuild their lives and businesses 
after covered losses occur.  Insurer capital is traditionally referred to 
as policyholders’ surplus:  it is an essential component supporting the in-
surance promise.  The cost of that capital is an insurer expense that 
must be considered in pricing insurance—along with expected losses, 
sales, and administrative expenses for policies written.42
The capital needed by an insurer varies directly as a function of 
the risk that the insurer assumes.  If an insurer wishes to take on more 
42 Consider, for example, insurance for property damage caused by hurricanes.  
An insurer’s expected losses are relatively low, because in a typical year, the policy-
holder will not suffer a hurricane loss.  However, it is possible that losses will be quite 
high—far in excess of those expected at the time policies are priced.  In the event of a 
serious hurricane, a substantial portion of the loss must be paid from insurer capital.  
For other extreme events, such as terrorism, maximum losses are extremely high rela-
tive to expected losses, so the capital issue is critical. 
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risk, it must have capital to support the additional coverage it offers 
against that risk.  Insurance regulators and rating agencies devote signifi-
cant efforts toward evaluating the adequacy of the insurer capital rela-
tive to the amount and types of risk they are taking on (a) to assure 
policyholders that they will be able to recoup their claims following a 
large-scale disaster and (b) to assure investors in insurance companies 
that the latter have achieved a certain level of financial strength.  
Adequate capitalization is thus critical to the continued viability of an 
insurer. 
Insurance markets function best when the losses associated with a 
particular risk are independent of each other and the insurer has ac-
curate information on the likelihood of the relevant events occurring 
and the resulting damage.  By selling a large number of policies for a 
given risk, the insurer is likely to have an accurate estimate of the 
claim payments it expects to make during a given period of time.  To 
illustrate this point with a simple example, consider an insurer who 
provides fire insurance to a set of identical homes each valued at 
$100,000.  Using historical data, the insurer estimates that there is a 
0.1% chance that each home will be destroyed by fire next year.  In 
this case, the expected annual loss for each home from fire would be 
$100 (i.e., 1/1000 × $100,000). 
If the insurer issued only a single policy to cover the full loss from 
a fire, then there would be a variance of approximately $100 associ-
ated with its expected annual loss.43  As the number of policies issued 
(n) increases, the variance of the expected annual loss, or the mean 
loss per policy, decreases in proportion to n .  Thus, if n = 10, the vari-
ance of the mean loss will be approximately $10.  When n = 100, the 
variance decreases to $1, and when n = 1000, the variance is $0.10.  It 
is thus not necessary to issue a very large number of policies to reduce 
significantly the variability of expected annual losses per policy if the 
risks are independent.  This insurance model works well for risks such 
as fire, automobile, and loss of life because they satisfy the assump-
tions of independence and the ability to estimate probabilities and 
losses.  Risks associated with climate change do not satisfy the above 
conditions, however, so they are more problematic to insure. 
43 The variance for a single loss L with probability p is Lp(1 -p) .  If L = $100,000 
and p = 1/1000, then Lp(1 -p)  = $100,000(1/1000)(999/1000) or $99.90. 
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B.  Risk, Ambiguity, Uncertainty, and Ignorance 
An important element when it comes to climate change and in-
surance is the distinction between “risk” and “uncertainty.”  An event 
is considered to be risky when the probabilities that certain states will 
occur in the future are precisely known, such as in a fair roulette 
game.  In contrast, a risk is uncertain when the probabilities are not 
precisely known.  Examples of uncertainty are the likelihood of a ter-
rorist attack in New York City or the chance of a Category 5 hurricane 
hitting the coast of Florida in the next twelve months. 
The term uncertainty is often used interchangeably with the term 
ambiguity, which implies that there are vague beliefs about the likeli-
hood of events occurring.  If people are not able to form any beliefs 
about probabilities, this special case is termed complete ignorance.44  
Similar distinctions can be made relative to the outcome.  Based on 
current knowledge, the likelihood and consequences of weather-
related events associated with climate change are characterized by 
high levels of uncertainty. 
C.  Modeling Catastrophe 
Before insurance providers are willing to offer coverage against an 
uncertain event, they must be able to identify and quantify, or at least 
partially estimate, the chances of the event occurring and the extent 
of losses likely to be incurred.  Such estimates can be based on past 
data (for example, loss history of the insurer’s portfolio of policyhold-
ers or loss history in a specific region) coupled with data on what ex-
perts know about a particular risk through the use of catastrophe 
models. 
The four basic components of a catastrophe model, as depicted in 
Figure 3, are hazard, inventory, vulnerability, and loss and are herein 
illustrated for a natural hazard such as a hurricane.  First, the model 
determines the risk of the hazard phenomenon, which in the case of a 
hurricane is characterized by its projected path and wind speed.  Next, 
the model characterizes the inventory (or portfolio) of properties at 
risk as accurately as possible.  This is done by first assigning geo-
graphic coordinates to a property and then determining how many 
structures in the insurer’s portfolio are at risk from hurricanes of dif-
44 See Colin Camerer & Martin Weber, Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences:  
Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 325, 325-26 (1992) (discussing 
situations in which individuals are unable to characterize ambiguous risks). 
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ferent wind speeds and projected paths.  After identifying each prop-
erty’s spatial location, other factors are considered, including its con-
struction type, the number of stories in the structure, and its age. 
 
Figure 3:  Structure of Catastrophe Models 
 
 
The hazard and inventory modules enable one to calculate the 
vulnerability, or susceptibility, to damage of the structures at risk.  In 
essence, this step in the catastrophe model quantifies the physical im-
pact of the natural hazard phenomenon on the property at risk.  How 
this vulnerability is quantified differs from model to model.  Once it is 
calculated, the loss to the property inventory is evaluated.  In a catas-
trophe model, loss is characterized as direct or indirect in nature.  Di-
rect losses include the cost to repair or replace a structure, which must 
anticipate future increases in cost of material and workforce due to 
the demand surge in the aftermath of a major disaster.  Indirect losses 
include business interruption and the expense of relocating residents 
who are forced to evacuate their homes. 
D.  Exceedance Probability Curves 
Based on the outputs of a catastrophe model, the insurer can con-
struct an exceedance probability (EP) curve that specifies the prob-
ability that a certain level of losses will be exceeded in a specific loca-
tion (or in its entire portfolio) over a specific period of time (for 
example, one year, ten years, etc.).  These losses can be measured in 
dollars of damage, fatalities, illness, or some other unit of analysis. 
Suppose one were interested in constructing an EP curve for an 
insurer with a given portfolio of insurance policies covering hurricane 
wind damage in a southeastern United States coastal community.  
One would combine the set of events that could produce a given dol-
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lar loss and then determine the resulting probabilities of exceeding 
losses of different dollar magnitudes.  Based on these estimates, one 
can construct a mean EP curve, such as the one depicted in Figure 4.  
The x -axis measures the loss to the insurer in dollars and the y -axis 
depicts the probability that losses will exceed a particular level.  Sup-
pose the insurer focuses on a specific loss, Li .   One can see from Fig-
ure 4 that the likelihood that insured losses exceed Li  is given by pi .  
An insurer utilizes its EP curve to determine how many structures 
it will want to include in its portfolio.  More specifically, if the insurer 
wanted to reduce the probability that a loss from hurricanes exceed-
ing Li  will occur below pi ,  it will have to select one of several options.  
It could reduce the number of policies in force for these hazards, in-
crease the premium it charges, or decide not to offer this type of cov-
erage at all. 
 
Figure 4:  Sample Mean Exceedance Probability Curve 
 
 
Government agencies may want to use EP curves to estimate the 
likelihood that losses to specific communities or regions from natural 
disasters will exceed certain levels.  This, in turn, will help determine 
the likelihood that the government will need to provide disaster assis-
tance to these stricken areas.  At the start of the hurricane season in 
2004, Florida could have used an EP curve to estimate the likelihood 
of insured damage exceeding $23 billion.  This probability would have 
been extremely low, but we now know that a confluence of major 
events (Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne) produced ag-
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gregate losses that exceeded this dollar value.  This raises the question 
of how confident we are in the construction of a specific EP curve. 
The uncertainty surrounding an EP curve is reflected in the 5% 
and 95% confidence interval curves shown in Figure 5.  The curve de-
picting the uncertainty in loss shows a range of values, Li
. 05 and Li
. 95
 
that losses can take for a given mean value, Li ,  so that there is a 95% 
chance that the loss will be exceeded with probability pi .   In a similar 
vein, one can determine the range of probabilities p i
. 0 5  and p i
. 9 5  so 
that there is 95% certainty that losses will exceed Li .   For low prob-
ability, high consequence risks, the spread between the 5% and 95% 
confidence intervals depicted in Figure 5 can be significant. 
 
Figure 5:  Confidence Intervals for a Mean Exceedance  
Probability (EP) Curve 
 
The EP curve serves as an important tool for evaluating risk man-
agement strategies.  It puts pressure on experts to make explicit the 
assumptions on which they base their estimates of the likelihood of 
certain events occurring and the resulting consequences.  The more 
specific the EP curve, the higher the uncertainty associated with the 
estimates is likely to be.  Thus, the EP curve for a particular insurer’s 
exposure to hurricane claims in Miami will be much more uncertain 
than the EP curve for the hurricane exposure of the entire industry in 
the southeastern United States. 
  
2007] CLIMATE CHANGE, INSURABILITY, AND LIABILITY 1817 
E.  Application to Florida:  Focus on Hurricane Risks45
Risk Management Solutions (RMS) has provided us with an analy-
sis of the data from the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund (FHCF) 
book of business as of 2005.  Since the FHCF is a state-mandated rein-
surance program, it has every residential insurance policy written in 
the state.  Data collected for this simulation include all lines of cover-
age of the FHCF.  Total insured value (TIV) by the fund at the end of 
2005 was estimated to be $1.7 trillion for the entire state of Florida.  
We focus on wind coverage only.46
Table 2 provides estimates of the annual probability that insured 
wind losses from hurricanes will equal or exceed different magnitudes 
for eighteen thresholds ranging from $1 billion to $350 billion.  More 
specifically, there is a 42.5% chance that there will be at least $1 bil-
lion of insured residential losses in Florida next year.  The probability 
that hurricanes will inflict at least $10 billion of insured residential 
losses in Florida next year is 15% and there is a 1.7% chance that in-
sured losses will be at least $50 billion. 
 
Table 2:  Exceedance Probability of Insured Residential  
Losses in Florida (in billions of dollars) 47
 
$1 $2 $5 $10 $15 $20 $25 $30 $40 
42.5% 35.9% 24.5% 15.0% 10.1% 6.9% 5.0% 3.9% 2.5% 
         
$50 $60 $75 $100 $125 $150 $200 $250 $350 
1.7% 1.3% 0.81% 0.41% 0.22% 0.11% 0.028% 0.005% 0.00012% 
 
As one can see from this table, the probability decreases signifi-
cantly as the threshold level of losses increases.  For very high levels of 
insured losses ($100 billion and greater), the exceedance probability 
 
45 We would like to thank Jack Nicholson of the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe 
Fund (FHCF) for providing us with the FHCF database and Patricia Grossi and Robert 
Muir-Wood of Risk Management Solutions (RMS) for their analyses of the FHCF data.  
They provided us with the relevant EP curves and tables presented in this section. 
46 For purposes of this Article, we use the new generation of models developed by 
RMS in 2006. 
 47 MANAGING LARGE-SCALE RISKS, supra note 13, at 25 tbl.2.2. 
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is less than 0.5%.  This translates into a hurricane that occurs less than 
once every 200 years.  Of course, such an unlikely catastrophic event 
could occur during the next hurricane season.  By undertaking this 
analysis for all possible levels of insured hurricane losses, one can 
generate the entire exceedance probability curve for the FHCF.  Fig-
ure 6 provides this curve for losses up to $100 billion. 
 
Figure 6:  Exceedance Probability Curve for Florida (Entire FHCF 
Portfolio) for Insured Losses from Hurricanes up to $100 Billion 48
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In order to measure the uncertainty surrounding these estimates, 
one needs to utilize data on the average annual expected losses and 
the standard deviation for each ZIP code in the state.  For all ZIP 
codes combined, we found that the average annual expected loss for 
Florida residential insurance is $5.4 billion and the standard deviation 
is $13.9 billion (a 2.55 coefficient of variation). 
Extreme events, such as natural disasters, are thus particularly 
challenging for insurers because they involve potentially high losses 
that are extremely uncertain.  Figure 7 illustrates the total number of 
loss events between 1950 and 2000 in the United States for three 
prevalent natural hazards:  earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes.  
Events were selected that had at least $1 billion of economic damage 
 
 48 Id. at 26 fig.2.8. 
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and/or over fifty deaths.49  Looking across all the disasters of a par-
ticular type (earthquake, hurricane, or flood) for this fifty-year period, 
the median loss is low, while the maximum loss is very high.  Given 
this wide variation in loss distribution, it is not surprising that insurers 
are concerned about uncertainty when they estimate premiums, or 
even when they decide whether to provide any coverage in certain 
hazard-prone areas. 
 
Figure 7:  Historical Economic Losses in Billions of Dollars 
Versus Type of Significant U.S. Natural Disaster  
for the Fifty-Year Period from 1950 to 2000 
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In the case of natural disasters, the future is likely to be different 
from the past.  As discussed earlier, among the twenty most costly in-
surance losses from catastrophes between 1970 and 2005, ten oc-
curred after 2000.50  The 2004 and 2005 seasons dramatically changed 
the upper limits in Figure 6.  Hurricane Katrina in 2005 is said to have 
caused between $150 billion and $170 billion in economic losses, 
more than four times higher than those inflicted by the most costly 
49 Press Release, American Re Publishes Topics “Annual Review of North Ameri-
can Natural Catastrophes 2001” (May 8, 2002), available at http:// 
www.munichreamerica.com/content/press/topics_05-8-02.htm. 
50 See supra notes 6 -9 and accompanying text. 
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hurricane between 1950 and 2000.  In 2006, not a single major hurri-
cane hit the United States. 
F.  Determining Whether To Provide Coverage 
Based on its knowledge of likelihood and outcome, an insurer still 
has to make a decision as to whether to cover the risk (unless it is re-
quired to do so by law).  In his study on insurers’ decision rules re-
garding when they would market coverage for a specific risk, Stone 51 
develops a model whereby firms maximize expected profits subject to 
satisfying a constraint related to the survival of the firm.52  An insurer 
satisfies its survival constraint by choosing a portfolio of risks with an 
overall expected probability of total claims payments greater than 
some predetermined amount, L*, that is less than some threshold 
probability, p1.  This threshold probability reflects the tradeoff be-
tween the expected benefits of insuring another risk and the costs to 
the firm of a catastrophic loss that reduces the insurer’s surplus by L* 
or more.  This threshold probability does not necessarily correspond 
to what would be efficient for society.  The value of L* is determined 
by an insurer’s concern with insolvency and/or a sufficiently large loss 
in surplus, which may lead a rating agency to downgrade its credit rat-
ing. 
A simple example illustrates how an insurer would utilize its sur-
vival constraint to determine whether a particular portfolio of risks is 
insurable with respect to hurricanes.  Assume that all homes in a hur-
ricane-prone area are identical and equally resistant to damage such 
that the insurance premium, z, is the same for each structure.  Fur-
ther, assume that an insurer has A dollars in current surplus and that 
it wants to determine the number of policies it can write and still sat-
isfy its survival constraint.  Then, the maximum number of policies, n ,  
satisfying the survival constraint is given by: 
 
Probability [Claims Payments (L*)  > (n × z + A)] < p1 .  
 
51 See James M. Stone, A Theory of Capacity and the Insurance of Catastrophe Risks, pts. 
1&2, 40 J. RISK & INS. 231, 339 (1973). 
52 Stone also introduces a constraint regarding the stability of the insurer’s opera-
tion.  See Stone (pt. 1), supra note 51, at 232 (recognizing the stability constraint and 
suggesting it results from investors’ and managers’ preferences for “some regularity”).  
However, insurers have traditionally not focused on this constraint in the context of 
catastrophic risks. 
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The insurer will use the survival constraint to determine the 
maximum number of policies it is willing to offer, possibly with an ad-
justment in the amount of coverage and premiums and/or a transfer 
of some of the risk to others in the private sector, such as reinsurers or 
capital markets.  It may also rely on governmental programs to cover 
its catastrophic losses. 
Following the series of natural disasters that occurred at the end 
of the 1980s and in the 1990s, insurers focused on the survival con-
straint to determine the amount of catastrophe coverage they were 
willing to provide because they wanted to ensure that their aggregate 
exposure to a particular risk did not exceed a certain level.  This was 
driven, at least in part, by rating agencies such as A.M. Best, which 
considered insurers’ exposure to catastrophic losses as a relevant ele-
ment in determining credit ratings. 
At that time, the insurance industry was unaware of the potentially 
large losses they could suffer from natural disasters.  More specifically, 
some insurers were surprised at the magnitude of their losses from 
Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the Northridge earthquake in 1994.  
In fact, following Hurricane Andrew, many insurers only marketed 
coverage against wind damage in Florida because they were required 
to do so and state insurance pools were formed to limit their risk.53  In 
California, insurers refused to renew homeowners’ earthquake poli-
cies after the 1994 Northridge earthquake, and in their place the Cali-
fornia Earthquake Authority was formed by the state in 1996 with 
funds from insurers and reinsurers.54
G.  Setting Premiums 
If the insurer decides to offer coverage, it needs to determine a 
premium rate that yields a profit and satisfies the survival constraint 
given by the above equation.  State regulations often limit insurers in 
their rate-setting process.  Competition may also limit what premium 
can be charged in a given marketplace.  Even in the absence of these 
influences, an insurer must consider problems associated with the am-
53 See MARTIN F. GRACE ET AL., CATASTROPHE INSURANCE:  CONSUMER DEMAND, 
MARKETS AND REGULATION 62-64 (2003) (noting that Florida imposed a moratorium 
on policy terminations after Hurricane Andrew and discussing the pools set up by the 
state to insure those unable to obtain coverage in the voluntary market). 
54 Richard J. Roth, Jr., Earthquake Insurance Protection in California, in PAYING THE 
PRICE:  THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 67, 69-78 (Howard Kunreuther & Richard J. Roth, Sr. eds., 1998). 
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biguity of the risk, the asymmetry of information (adverse selection and 
moral hazard), and the degree of correlation of the risk in determining 
what premium to charge.  We will examine each of these factors in 
turn. 
1.  Impact of the Ambiguity of the Risk 
The infrequency of major catastrophes in a single location implies 
that the loss distribution is not well specified.  The ambiguities associ-
ated with the probability of an extreme event and with the outcomes 
of such an event raise a number of challenges for insurers when they 
price their policies.  As shown by a series of empirical studies, actuar-
ies and underwriters are averse to ambiguity and want to charge much 
higher premiums when the likelihood and/or consequences of a risk 
are highly uncertain than when these components of risk are well 
specified. 
Kunreuther and his co-authors conducted a survey of 896 under-
writers in 190 randomly chosen insurance companies to determine 
what premiums would be required to insure a factory against property 
damage from a severe earthquake.55  The survey examined changes in 
pricing strategy as a function of the degree of uncertainty in either the 
probability and/or the loss.  A probability was considered to be well 
specified when there was enough historical information on an event 
that all experts agreed that the probability of a loss was p.  When there 
was wide disagreement about the estimate of p among the experts, 
they referred to this ambiguous probability as Ap.  L represents a 
known loss reflecting a general consensus as to what insurers’ claims 
would likely be in the event of a disaster.  When the experts’ estimates 
range between Lmin and Lmax , this uncertain loss is denoted as UL .  
Combining the degree of probability and loss uncertainty leads to the 
four cases shown in the columns of Table 3. 
To see how underwriters reacted to different situations, four sce-
narios were constructed, as shown by the rows in Table 3.  The prob-
ability of the earthquake, where the risk is well specified, is either 0.01 
or 0.005; the loss, should the event occur, is either $1 million or $10 
million.  The premium set by the underwriter is standardized at one 
for the nonambiguous case.  One can then examine how ambiguity 
affects pricing decisions. 
55 Howard Kunreuther et al., Ambiguity and Underwriter Decision Processes, 26 J. 
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 337, 342-44 (1995). 
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Table 3 shows the ratio of the other three cases relative to the 
nonambiguous case (p,L) for the four different scenarios, which were 
distributed randomly to underwriters in primary insurance compa-
nies.  For the highly ambiguous case (Ap,UL), the premiums were sig-
nificantly higher than if underwriters priced a nonambiguous risk.  
The ratios for the other two cases were always above 1, but less than 
the Ap,UL case.  Since measuring the impact of global warming on the 
likelihood and consequences of weather-related catastrophes is even 
more ambiguous than measuring the earthquake risk, one would ex-
pect the ratio of Ap,UL relative to p,L to be higher if underwriters 
were asked the same questions for setting the corresponding premi-
ums for these disasters. 
 
Table 3:  Ratios of Underwriters’ Premiums for Ambiguous or  
Uncertain Earthquake Risks Relative to Well-Specified Risks 56
 
Scenario Cases 
 1 2 3 4 
 
 p,L Ap,L P,UL Ap,UL 
N** 
p = .005 
L = $1 million 1 1.28 1.19 1.77 17 
p = .005 
L = $10 million 1 1.31 1.29 1.59 8 
p = .01 
L = $1 million 1 1.19 1.21 1.50 23 
p = .01 
L = $10 million 1 1.38 1.15 1.43 6 
 
The nature of the ambiguity is also important.  Recent research 
shows, for instance, that insurers are sensitive to sources of ambiguity.  
Cabantous provides the results of an insurers’ survey in France.  The 
seventy-eight actuaries surveyed typically charged a much higher pre-
mium when ambiguity came from conflict and disagreement regard-
ing the probability of a loss than when the ambiguity came from im-
precision (i.e., an imprecise forecast).57
 
56 Howard Kunreuther, Insurability Conditions and the Supply of Coverage, in PAYING 
THE PRICE, supra note 54, at 17, 34 tbl.2-1.  Ratios are based on mean premiums across 
number of respondents for each scenario.  N = number of respondents. 
57 Laure Cabantous, Ambiguity Aversion in the Field of Insurance:  Insurers’ Attitude to 
Imprecise and Conflicting Probability Estimates, 62 THEORY & DECISION 219, 235 (2007). 
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There also are other insurability issues that result from the asym-
metry of information that exists between the insurers and the insured. 
2.  Adverse Selection 
Suppose that the insurer cannot differentiate the risks facing two 
groups of potential insurance buyers and that each buyer knows her 
own risk.  In this case, the insurer is likely to suffer losses if it sets the 
same premium for both groups by using the entire population as a ba-
sis for this estimate.  Then only the highest-risk group is likely to pur-
chase coverage for that hazard and the premium is below the in-
sured’s expected loss, meaning that the insurer will have a portfolio of 
“bad” risks.  This situation, referred to as adverse selection, can be recti-
fied if the insurer charges a high enough premium to cover the losses 
from the bad risks.  In so doing, the good risks might purchase only 
partial protection or no insurance at all because they consider the 
price of coverage to be too expensive relative to their risk.58
The problem of adverse selection only emerges in unregulated 
markets if those considering the purchase of insurance have more ac-
curate information on the probability of a loss than the firms selling 
coverage.  If the policyholders and insurers both cannot distinguish 
their risks, then coverage will be offered at a single premium based on 
the average risk and both good and bad risks will want to purchase 
policies. 
In the context of climate change, adverse selection is not likely to 
be a problem, as there is no evidence that those at risk have an infor-
mational advantage over the insurer.  In fact, the opposite might be 
true:  if insurance companies spend significant resources estimating 
the risk, they might gain an informational advantage over their poli-
cyholders who cannot afford that costly risk assessment or do not want 
to do so.  Over the past five or six years, there has been a growing lit-
erature studying the impact of insurers being more knowledgeable 
about the risks than the insureds themselves.  Research in this field 
reveals that insurers might want to exploit this “reverse information 
asymmetry,” which results in low risks being optimally covered while 
high risks are not.59
58 For a survey of adverse selection issues, see Georges Dionne et al., Adverse Selec-
tion in Insurance Markets, in HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 185 (Georges Dionne ed., 2000). 
59 See Dominique Henriet & Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan, Optimal Risk-Sharing Un-
der Dual Asymmetry of Both Information and Market Power:  A Unifying Approach 20 
(June 7, 2006) (unpublished working paper, available at http:// 
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3.  Moral Hazard 
The concept of “moral hazard” refers to an increase in the ex-
pected loss (probability or amount of loss conditional on an event oc-
curring) caused by insurance-induced changes in the behavior of the 
policyholder.  An example of moral hazard is more careless behavior 
on the part of the insured vis-à-vis natural hazards or other types of 
risk as a result of purchasing coverage.  Providing insurance protec-
tion may lead the policyholder to change behavior in ways that in-
crease the expected loss from what it would have been without cover-
age.  If the insurer cannot predict this behavior and relies on past loss 
data from uninsured individuals to estimate rates, the resulting pre-
mium is likely to be insufficient to cover losses. 
Even after the insurer is aware that people with insurance have 
higher losses, its inability to observe loss-enhancing behavior may cre-
ate problems of moral hazard.  The introduction of specific deducti-
bles, coinsurance, or upper limits on coverage can be useful tools for 
reducing moral hazard by encouraging insureds to engage in less risky 
behavior, as they know they will have to incur part of the losses from 
an adverse event.  It is unclear whether moral hazard plays a role in 
the context of global climate change. 
4.  Correlated Risks 
For extreme events, the potential for high correlation between the 
risks impacts the tail of the distribution.  In other words, at a prede-
fined probability pi ,  the region below the EP curve is likely to expand 
for higher correlated risks covered by insurers.  This requires addi-
tional capital for the insurer to protect itself against large losses.  Even 
risks that are assumed to be independent, such as fire, can be highly 
correlated.  For example, the Oakland conflagration of October 20, 
1991 damaged or destroyed 3000 structures for a total insured loss of 
$1.7 billion.  More recently, the fires in Southern California between 
October 23 and November 6, 2003, destroyed over 750,000 acres of 
land and approximately 4000 residential properties.60
opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/06-10.pdf) (“[W]hen the insurer is better in-
formed than the insured about risk, then whatever his position (principal or agent), 
that is whatever his bargaining power, low risk is better insured than high risk.”). 
60 Pat West, Lessons Learned from Southern California’s Firestorms Released, FIRE CHIEF, 
Jan. 23, 2004, available at  http://firechief.com/news/firefighting_lessons_learned_southern. 
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Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, which devastated the U.S. Gulf Coast 
in August and September of 2005, dramatically impacted several lines 
of insurance, including life, property damage, and business interrup-
tion.  Edward Liddy, Chairman of Allstate, which provided insurance 
coverage to 350,000 homeowners in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Ala-
bama, declared: 
Extensive flooding, particularly in New Orleans, has complicated disaster 
planning . . . . [y]et the high water has essentially halted efforts to assess 
the damage . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . We now have 1,100 adjusters on the ground . . . . We have another 
500 who are ready to go as soon as we can get into some of those most-
devastated areas. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . It will be many weeks, probably months, before there are anything 
approaching reliable estimates.
61
IV.  OTHER STAKEHOLDERS AFFECTING INSURERS’ DECISIONS 
Our analysis of insurability would not be complete without con-
sidering the environment in which insurers have to make decisions.  
There are several other important players whose actions affect insur-
ers’ decisions on whether to provide coverage against certain risks 
and, if so, how much to offer and what price to charge.  We discuss 
the roles of five key parties:  reinsurers, insurance commissioners, rat-
ing agencies, modeling firms, and investors. 
A.  Reinsurers 
How much coverage an insurer can provide in a certain area de-
pends also on what portion of its exposure it can transfer to reinsur-
ers.  Reinsurers provide protection to private insurers in much the 
same way that insurers provide coverage to their policyholders.  They 
charge a premium to indemnify an insurance company against a layer 
of catastrophic losses that the insurer would otherwise be responsible 
for covering.  Reinsurers are also concerned with their concentration 
61 Theo Francis, CEO Says Allstate Adjusts Storm Plan, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2005, at 
C1. 
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of risk and thus restrict their exposure in catastrophe-prone areas to 
keep the probability of a severe loss at an acceptable level.  Large rein-
surers who operate worldwide can diversify their risk geographically 
and per line of coverage much more easily than most insurers can. 
Reinsurers typically play a key role in sharing a significant portion 
of the insured losses with the insurers.  For example, reinsurers paid 
about 50% of the insured losses due to Hurricane Katrina.  As a result 
of the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, the price of catastrophe rein-
surance in the United States increased significantly and there is con-
siderable uncertainty concerning the availability of coverage and the 
resulting prices in the coming year.  It should not come as a surprise 
that the two largest reinsurers in the world, Swiss Re and Munich Re, 
have been active in climate change research for some time now. 
B.  Capital Markets 
Capital markets emerged in the 1990s as a complement to rein-
surance for covering large losses from natural disasters through new 
financial instruments.  Examples of these instruments include industry 
loss warranties, catastrophe bonds, and, more recently, sidecar rein-
surers. 
The shortage of reinsurance following Hurricane Andrew in 1992 
and the Northridge earthquake in 1994 led to higher reinsurance 
prices and made it appealing for insurers to offer catastrophe bonds 
with high enough interest rates to attract capital from investors.  In 
addition, the prospect of an investment that is uncorrelated with the 
stock market or with general economic conditions is attractive to capi-
tal market investors.  Finally, catastrophe models have emerged as a 
tool for more rigorously estimating loss probabilities, so disaster risk 
can be more accurately quantified—and priced—than in the past. 
Since Hurricane Katrina, there has been a significant increase in 
the number and volume of catastrophe bond issuances and the crea-
tion of sidecars, but the total volume of financial protection remains 
somewhat limited relative to what is currently provided by traditional 
reinsurance.  Hence, there is a need to assess the constraints on the 
availability and volume of securities that diversify catastrophe risk and 
how the use of these vehicles could be expanded to augment reinsur-
ance capacity. 
The 2005 hurricane season led insurers and reinsurers to use al-
ternative risk transfer instruments with unprecedented frequency.  For 
instance, the market for catastrophe bonds recorded a total issuance 
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of over $2.1 billion in 2005, a 75% increase over the $1.14 billion issu-
ance in 2003 (the previous record holder).  For the first five months 
in 2006, the total issuance was close to the total capital issued for the 
entire year of 2005.62
C.  State Insurance Commissioners 
In the United States, insurance is regulated at the state level, with 
the principal authority residing with insurance commissioners.  Do-
mestic reinsurers are subject to solvency regulation but not to rate or 
policy form regulation.  Solvency regulation addresses the question of 
whether the insurer or reinsurer is sufficiently capitalized to fulfill its 
obligations if a significant event occurs and inflicts major losses on its 
policyholders.  Insurance commissioners regard solvency as a concern 
even if it means requiring higher premiums.  On the other hand, they 
want insurance to be sold at affordable prices.  In balancing the sol-
vency and consumer protection goals, insurance regulators are con-
cerned that rates are adequate, not excessive, and not unfairly dis-
criminatory.  These terms are somewhat imprecise, so regulators have 
some latitude in controlling insurer behavior. 
In March 2006, the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners (NAIC) established a task force to study how climate change 
may affect the availability and affordability of insurance for consumers 
and the financial health of insurance companies.  The task force, led 
by Tim Wagner, Director of the Nebraska Department of Insurance, 
and Mike Kreidler, Insurance Commissioner for the State of Washing-
ton, will also consider actions that would enable state regulators and 
insurers to work together to mitigate risks associated with climate 
change.63
D.  Modeling Firms 
As discussed above, many insurance and reinsurance companies 
have turned to firms specializing in the business of modeling catastro-
phe risks to assist them in determining how much coverage to offer 
and what premiums to charge for losses from natural disasters.  Over 
the past ten years, these companies have become important players in 
62 MANAGING LARGE-SCALE RISKS, supra note 13, at 105. 
63 See Regulators Establish Task Force on Climate Change, INS. J., Mar. 14, 2006, avail-
able at http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2006/03/14/66451/ 
htm?print=1 (reporting the establishment of the task force and its objectives). 
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the field of catastrophe insurance and reinsurance.  As a result of the 
2005 hurricane season, Risk Management Solutions, one of the lead-
ing catastrophe modeling firms, announced in March 2006 that 
changes of hurricane landfall frequencies in its new model will in-
crease its estimates of average annual insurance losses by 40% across 
the Gulf Coast, Florida, and the Southeast.  The new model also in-
creased RMS’s annual insurance loss predictions by 25% to 30% in the 
mid-Atlantic and Northeast coastal regions from its former predic-
tions.64
This revised view of hurricane risk is driven by an increase of more 
than 30% in the modeled frequency of major hurricanes (Category 3-
5) in the Atlantic basin that is expected to persist for at least the next 
five years.  How the insurance market and regulators will react to this 
new dimension is still an open issue and will certainly depend on es-
timates by the other two leading modeling firms, AIR Worldwide and 
EQECAT, both of whom have adjusted their estimates upward by a 
much smaller percentage than has RMS.  However, both of these firms 
offer a near-term model reflecting higher rates due to current warm-
ing of sea surface temperatures, which they expect to cause an in-
crease in hurricane activity.65
E.  Rating Agencies 
Rating agencies, such as A.M. Best, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, 
and Fitch, provide independent evaluations of insurers’ and reinsur-
ers’ financial stability and their ability to meet their obligations to 
policyholders.  The rating assigned to an insurer or reinsurer has sig-
nificant consequences with respect to the premiums it can set and its 
ability to raise capital.  For example, many large publicly traded com-
panies require their insurers to have a rating above a certain mini-
mum level.  Similarly, insurers are less willing to cede their risks to a 
poorly rated reinsurer.  A low rating has an impact on the premium 
an insurer or reinsurer can charge or the amount of coverage it is able 
to sell.  It is also likely to have a negative effect on the share price of 
publicly traded firms. 
To illustrate how ratings are determined, consider A.M. Best.  It 
undertakes a quantitative analysis of an insurer’s balance sheet 
64 Press Release, Risk Mgmt. Solutions, New RMS View of U.S. Hurricane Activity 
Rates Increases Losses by 40% in Fla. and Gulf Coast (Mar. 23, 2006), available at 
http://www.rms.com/NewsPress/PR_2006_0323_HUActivityRates.asp. 
65 See supra Part II. 
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strength, operating performance, and business profile.  Evaluating ca-
tastrophe exposure plays a significant role in the determination of rat-
ings, as catastrophes are events that could threaten the solvency of a 
company.  Projected losses from disasters occurring at specified return 
periods (e.g., a 100-year windstorm/hurricane or a 250-year earth-
quake) and the associated reinsurance programs to cover them are 
two important components of the rating questionnaires that insurers 
are required to complete. 
For several years now, A.M. Best has been requesting such infor-
mation on natural disasters.  Its approach has been an important step 
toward incorporating catastrophe risk into an insurer’s capital ade-
quacy requirements.  Until recently, the rating agency has been in-
cluding probable maximum loss (PML) for only one of these severe 
events (for example, a 100-year windstorm or 250-year earthquake, 
depending on the nature of the primary risk to which the insurer was 
exposed) in its calculation of a company’s risk-adjusted capitalization.  
In 2006, A.M. Best introduced a second event as an additional stress 
test.  The PML used for the second event is the same as for the first 
event in the case of a severe hurricane (which is considered to be an 
independent, 1-in-100-year event).  If the main exposure facing the 
insurer is an earthquake, however, the second event is reduced from a 
1-in-250-year event to a 1-in-100-year event (as the occurrence of one 
earthquake reduces the probability that another severe earthquake 
will occur in the short term).66
F.  Investors 
The large increase in insured losses in the last ten years, the 
changes in the catastrophic risk models in 2006, and the requirement 
by rating agencies to include a second stress test have important con-
sequences for determining the insurability of hurricanes and other 
natural disasters.  Moreover, recent catastrophes have revealed a 
much higher degree of volatility for any given portfolio than was ob-
served in the past.  This will also have an impact on the cost of capital 
to insurers and reinsurers.  With higher volatility, investors will de-
mand a higher return on equity.  This requires insurers to restrict 
their coverage, charge higher premiums, and improve their exposure 
management.  Parallel to this, if the price of insurance or reinsurance 
66 A.M. BEST, METHODOLOGY:  CATASTROPHE ANALYSIS IN A.M. BEST RATINGS 2-3 
(2006), available at http://www.ambest.com/ratings/methodology/catastrophe.pdf. 
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is high, opportunities for investors to launch new companies will in-
crease, as they did after the 2005 hurricane season. 
V.  ANOTHER UNCERTAINTY FACING INSURERS:   
LIABILITY FROM CLIMATE CHANGE 
We now turn to the following related issue facing insurers:  their 
potential liability for losses claimed to have been due to climate 
change induced by their policyholders (i.e., firms).  For example, the 
issue could arise from legal actions against executives for failing to re-
port to their shareholders some of the climate-related risks faced by 
the company.  We first address the liability question by examining the 
role that tort law plays in holding individuals accountable for damage 
and discuss the current debate regarding its applicability to climate 
change.  We then examine the role of Directors’ and Officers’ liability 
insurance (D&O) in the context of climate change risks.  The section 
concludes with a brief discussion of how companies can be encour-
aged by insurance to mitigate future damage from climate change. 
The first carbon dioxide lawsuit in the United States was filed in 
July 2004.  Eight states and New York City sued five large electricity 
utilities comprising the country’s biggest emitters of carbon dioxide 
and operating 174 power plants in twenty states.  Although the case 
was dismissed,67 the use of liability as a wedge for climate policy action 
may play a greater role in coming years.  If this case had not been 
dismissed, the insurers of the five utilities could have been financially 
responsible for the damage settlement and the court costs. 
One of the open issues is whether tort law is appropriate for hold-
ing firms financially accountable for specific losses suffered by others 
because their actions were partially responsible for global warming.  
As Michael Faure and David Grimeaud note, the first goal of tort law is 
to minimize the sum of accident costs and the costs of accident avoid-
ance—in other words, to minimize the total cost of accidents.68
Steven Shavell69 has laid out a simple analytic model for determin-
ing the level of care, x, that should be taken by a potential victim, A, 
and the level of care, y ,  that should be taken by a potential injurer, B, 
to minimize total expected cost [C(x,y)] where: 
67 Some states may, however, appeal this judgment. 
68 Michael Faure & David Grimeaud, Principles of Liability:  A Theoretical Framework, 
in DETERRENCE, INSURABILITY, AND COMPENSATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 19-20 
(Michael Faure ed., 2003). 
69 STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 32-46 (1987). 
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C(x,y)  =  p(x,y)  L +  A(x)  +  B(y)  
 p(x,y) = probability of an accident 
 L = the magnitude of the resulting loss. 
This model is appropriate for cases where both p(x,y) and L are 
well defined.  However, it is difficult to characterize these parameters 
with respect to global climate change based on our current state of 
scientific knowledge. 
Despite this element of uncertainty, litigation has emerged re-
garding global warming, with respect to carbon dioxide lawsuit emis-
sions, as noted above.  In another recent case, Massachusetts v. EPA,70 
twelve states and several cities and organizations (plaintiffs) chal-
lenged the denial of a petition asking the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to regulate carbon dioxide and other GHG emissions 
from new motor vehicles.  Indeed, the EPA administrator determined 
in 2003 that the Agency lacked authority under the Clean Air Act to 
regulate carbon dioxide.  But section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act71 
actually requires the EPA Administrator to set emission standards for 
“any air pollutant” from motor vehicles or motor vehicle engines that 
“in his judgment cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air pollution which 
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or wel-
fare.” 72  Originally, there was controversy among the three circuit 
court judges.  Judge Randolph ruled for the EPA, given uncertainty 
with respect to the relationship between motor vehicle emissions, 
GHGs, and climate change.73  Judge Tatel, on the other hand, found 
that the plaintiffs had standing because a rise in sea level would hurt 
Massachusetts, and that sea level rises were caused by human emis-
sions.74  The third judge, Judge Sentell, felt that causation was uncer-
tain but he could not review the EPA’s position without first giving 
Massachusetts standing.75
This case was argued in front of the U.S. Supreme Court on No-
vember 29, 2006 and decided on April 2, 2007.  The Court decided in 
70 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
 71 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000). 
 72 Id. 
73 Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 1438 
(2007). 
74 See id. at 64-74 (contending that Massachusetts has standing, the EPA has the 
authority to regulate GHG emissions, and that the EPA’s decision not to do so failed to 
meet the “arbitrary and capricious” standard). 
 75 Id. at 60.  For an additional analysis of Massachusetts v. EPA, see Daniel A. Far-
ber, Uncertainty as a Basis for Standing, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1123, 1128 (2005). 
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favor of the plaintiffs.  More specifically, the Court ruled that the 
Clean Air Act does give the EPA the authority to regulate emissions of 
GHGs, and hence found the EPA rationale for not taking this action 
inadequate. 
In a similar vein, inhabitants of Pacific Island nations claim that 
rising sea levels due to climate change have submerged their homes.  
They have announced intentions to commence litigation against ma-
jor sources of carbon dioxide emissions under the Alien Tort Claims 
Act,76 through which noncitizens can bring suits in federal court for 
violating international law.  The nations’ claim is that they will incur 
costs for relocating their populations or otherwise adapting to higher 
sea levels.77  Such litigation would face “enormous hurdles” given the 
difficulty in establishing specific causal links between activity of a cor-
poration and harm.78  Moreover, “an individual greenhouse gas-
producer’s liability for global climate change is generally nonquantifi-
able and may be largely dependent on external factors outside the 
producer’s control.” 79
A.  Compensation Based on Proportional Liability 
Climate change is subject to fluctuations in frequency and severity 
so that it is “difficult to differentiate a particular pattern change in 
temperature or sea level caused by anthropogenic climate change 
from one caused by natural variability.” 80  Nonetheless, even if it is 
impossible to attribute a specific event to climate change, one may still 
be able to compensate individuals because global warming increased 
the likelihood that an event would occur. 
Oxford University’s Myles Allen has taken this tack in dealing with 
the causality issue as it relates to climate change.  He considers the 
case of flooding in southern England in January 2003.  There, disaster 
victims claimed that the flooding was attributable to past GHG emis-
sions.  Allen cites the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change as concluding that “most of the ob-
76 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
77 See J. Kevin Healy & Jeffrey M. Tapick, Climate Change:  It’s Not Just a Policy Issue 
for Corporate Counsel—It’s a Legal Problem, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 89, 101-02 (2004). 
78 See Id. at 102. 
79 Elizabeth E. Hancock, Note, Red Dawn, Blue Thunder, Purple Rain:  Corporate Risk 
of Liability for Global Climate Change and the SEC Disclosure Dilemma, 17 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. 
L. REV. 233, 244 (2005). 
80 David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea:  Tort-Based Climate 
Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 24 (2003). 
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served warming over the past 50 years is likely [meaning, specifically, a 
better than two-in-three chance] to have been due to the increase in 
GHG concentrations.” 81  Allen proposes payments based on a form of 
proportional liability where the emitter is responsible for the in-
creased risk of flooding caused by the GHGs it produced.82
It is interesting to note that this approach has features similar to 
the assigned shares model developed twenty years ago by Stephen La-
gakos and Frederick Mosteller for providing compensation to cancer 
victims where the cause of the disease was difficult to determine.83  In 
their model, two subgroups of individuals are compared:  one ex-
posed to a specific dose of radiation and another that was not.  It is 
then possible to compute the ratio of the number of excess cancer 
cases in the exposed subgroup over the number of cancer cases in the 
nonexposed subgroup.  This fraction is designated as the assigned 
share and represents the probability that the cancer was caused by the 
radiation dose.  For instance, if there is a 20% chance that a randomly 
selected individual from the exposed group will have had his cancer 
caused by his previous radiation exposure, then the firm that exposed 
the individual to this radiation dose would pay 20% of the amount of 
compensation normally given to such a person who contracts cancer. 
With respect to global climate change, suppose that scientists be-
lieve that global warming due to GHG emissions has increased the 
frequency of hurricanes in a region by 40%.  If the property damage 
from a hurricane in Florida was $1 billion, according to this propor-
tional probabilistic liability approach, those whose actions have pro-
duced GHG emissions would be responsible for paying their share of 
40% of the losses. 
While this approach has theoretical merit, it faces practical diffi-
culties on several grounds.  First, it will be difficult to achieve any de-
finitive agreement by scientists on the extent to which global warming 
has increased the likelihood that natural disasters will occur.  Quanti-
fying the link between carbon dioxide emissions and an increase in 
81 Myles Allen, Liability for Climate Change:  Will It Ever Be Possible To Sue Anyone for 
Damaging the Climate?, 421 NATURE 891, 891 (2003). 
82 See id. at 891-92 (describing “apportion[ing] liability according to the change in 
risk” as the “equitable solution” to compensating victims of climate change); see also 
Myles R. Allen & Richard Lord, The Blame Game:  Who Will Pay for the Damaging Conse-
quences of Climate Change?, 432 NATURE 551, 552 (2004) (observing that English law 
permits increased risks to serve as a basis for compensation). 
83 Stephen W. Lagakos & Frederick Mosteller, Assigned Shares in Compensation for 
Radiation-Related Cancers, 6 RISK ANALYSIS 345, 346-47 (1986). 
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sea surface temperature is not easy.  Furthermore, as discussed earlier, 
there is a growing debate about the link between sea surface tempera-
ture and the increased frequency and/or severity of hurricanes.84  
Second, it will be extremely difficult to determine who is responsible 
for increasing GHGs unless one has some yardstick for measuring the 
amount in the atmosphere. 
On the other hand, polluters bear some responsibility for their 
impact on climate change.  Based on the current state of knowledge, 
the use of economic tools such as tradable emissions permits would 
certainly help in quantifying how many GHGs are emitted by each 
emitter.  But here again, as emissions are typically global, another 
challenge would be to assure that all emitters are paying for their por-
tion of the 40% of the loss. 
In the end, we might also see some judges ruling that if a specific 
industry, such as the electricity sector, is responsible for a large majority 
of the emissions in a country and is financially strong, it should be held 
responsible for the consequences of global warming and pay for it.  
How much responsibility, again, remains an open question.85
Perhaps of even greater importance in encouraging firms to take 
steps to reduce the risks of climate change is the threat of global 
warming class action suits.  This might be sufficient to encourage large 
emitters to restrict their future pollution to avoid being sued and for 
insurers to deny coverage to these firms unless they undertook such 
measures. 
There are precedents in other areas that may provide some guid-
ance as to what may happen in the future.  As Joni Hersch and Kip 
Viscusi note in this Symposium: 
While environmental litigation of this type is unprecedented, the ciga-
rette cases were novel as well.  The cigarette litigation did not establish 
legal precedents because the cases were settled without any court ver-
dicts, but the threat of the suits was sufficiently real that it led to dam-
ages payments of close to $250 billion.
86
84 See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. 
85 There might be positive externalities associated with global climate change as 
well.  For example, it has been shown that, under certain assumptions, climate change 
on U.S. agricultural land will increase annual profits by $1.3 billion (in 2002 dollars), 
or 4%.  See Olivier Deschenes & Michael Greenstone, The Economic Impacts of Climate 
Change:  Evidence from Agricultural Output and Random Fluctuations in Weather, 97 AM. 
ECON. REV. 354, 354 (2007). 
86 Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Allocating Responsibility for the Failure of Global 
Warming Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1657, 1657 (2007). 
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B.  Impact of Climate Change on Directors’ and Officers’ Coverage 
We now turn to another liability challenge that insurers will face 
in the coming years—possible legal actions against executives of com-
panies for failing to disclose to their shareholders some of the climate-
related risks faced by the company.  If such firms have D&O coverage, 
these individuals may be covered by this insurance should they be 
sued for wrongful acts committed in their role as company officers.  
Directors and officers must act with due diligence in carrying out their 
responsibilities and can be held personally liable if their actions result 
in a loss to the corporation or its shareholders.87  Anyone with an in-
terest in a corporation, whether a shareholder or a stakeholder alike, 
can file a claim if they feel wronged by corporate actions.  These 
claims can be costly, even if they are not considered valid, because the 
large expenses associated with any court case are normally covered by 
the insurer. 
The impact of court cases on an insurer providing D&O coverage 
to a firm can be better appreciated with respect to the financial re-
porting requirements imposed on publicly traded corporations under 
federal law in the United States.  The sufficiency of such a firm’s fi-
nancial disclosure can be questioned by its shareholders through a 
class action lawsuit.  In addition to the corporation itself, the defen-
dants in these cases are likely to include the board of directors and 
other members of the senior management.  Should this happen, these 
directors and officers would quite understandably turn to the firm for 
indemnification. Corporations are permitted to indemnify officers 
and directors for virtually any act undertaken in good faith or with the 
belief that it was in the best interest of the corporation.  To manage 
this financial exposure, and also reassure their board, companies of-
ten purchase D&O coverage.88
 Moreover, shareholders in a number of firms heavily involved 
with fossil fuels, as well as other firms that might be held responsible 
for contributing to global warming through their carbon dioxide 
emissions, are pressuring companies to disclose how global warming 
could impact their businesses.  As the debate on climate change inten-
sifies, there is a risk that the directors and officers of these firms will 
87 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding directors per-
sonally liable for breaching their duty of care in their approval of a merger without 
adequately informing themselves of the terms of the merger). 
88 The two largest insurance companies in the American D&O market are Chubb 
and AIG. 
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be sued for failing to exercise their fiduciary duty in the event that 
they do not take action to prepare for contingencies which may result 
from climate change. 
In April 2004, a group of thirteen public pension funds managing 
over $800 billion in assets wrote a letter to then-SEC Chairman Wil-
liam Donaldson asking him to clarify that climate change is indeed a 
material risk requiring disclosure on SEC filings and to strengthen 
current disclosure requirements, for example, by providing interpre-
tive guidance on the materiality of climate change risks.89  More re-
cently, in June 2006, this now enlarged group of investors—fifty mem-
bers of the Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR), representing 
nearly $3 trillion in assets—reiterated this demand to the new SEC 
Chairman.  As of today, the SEC has not finalized rules regarding dis-
closure of climate-change-related risks. 
In May 2005, a group of fourteen leading investors and other or-
ganizations worldwide launched a new effort to improve corporate 
disclosure of the risks and opportunities posed by global climate 
change—the Climate Risk Disclosure Initiative.  In October 2006, it 
released the Global Framework for Climate Risk Disclosure to provide 
specific guidance to companies regarding the information they 
provide to investors on the financial risks posed by climate change.90
In this context, it might be increasingly difficult for any publicly 
traded company not to consider seriously how climate change will 
affect its operations and financial results, and to report these as a part 
of environment liabilities in its annual SEC filings. 
A recent review of climate change reporting in the SEC filings of 
automobile, manufacturing, integrated oil and gas, insurance, petro-
chemicals, and utilities companies indicates that over the past five 
years, climate reporting has steadily increased in quality and has also 
doubled in number.  According to the report, all twenty-six electric 
utilities reported on climate risk, whereas five years ago, only half of 
the electric utilities disclosed climate risks to shareholders.91  How-
89 Letter from the Investor Network on Climate Risk to Christopher Cox, Chair-
man, SEC ( J une 14, 2006), available at http://www.ceres.org/pub/docs/ 
Ceres_INCR_SEC_letter_061406.pdf. 
90 CERES, GLOBAL FRAMEWORK FOR CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE (2006), available at 
http://www.ceres.org/pub/docs/Framework.pdf. 
91 MICHELLE CHAN-FISHEL, FIFTH SURVEY OF CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURE IN SEC 
FILINGS OF AUTOMOBILE, INSURANCE, OIL & GAS, PETROCHEMICAL, AND UTILITIES 
COMPANIES 23 (2006), available at http://www.foe.org/camps/intl/ 
SECFinalReportandAppendices.pdf. 
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ever, only six of the twenty-three automobile companies and only four 
of the largest twenty-seven property-casualty insurers in the United 
States surveyed for climate disclosure in 2005 had reported any cli-
mate change risk in their annual filings.92
In light of their cautious effort to exclude most liability exposure 
associated with pollution since 1985, one can anticipate that insurance 
companies providing D&O policies would resist covering “claims in 
which an insured failed to adequately disclose environmental liability 
on financial statements” 93 or has not maintained appropriate control 
of how the company has managed its environmental risks, including 
those related to climate change. 
For example, Swiss Re, a large player in D&O reinsurance, is treat-
ing climate change seriously in its dealings with corporations.  Accord-
ing to Ivo Menzinger, Head of Sustainability and Emerging Risk Man-
agement at Swiss Re: 
If the risk to be insured in our Directors and Officers insurance business 
for Large Corporate Risks has a potential carbon exposure, then we in-
vestigate how the company manages this aspect of its business opera-
tions.  This is primarily done through analyzing returns made to the an-
nual Carbon Disclosure Project survey of large corporates.  However, if 
there is insufficient information from this source we would request de-
tails from the company concerned directly.  This, together with other 
underwriting relevant information, flows into the decision about what 
coverage to offer and the pricing of the product.  This process has been 
in place since 2003.
94
A recent report by the insurance broker Marsh also confirms that 
insurers are becoming more concerned about their clients’ potential 
exposure to liability risk associated with climate change.  Among ques-
tions that insurers would typically ask their clients with respect to as-
sessing climate change and D&O risk are:  (1) “Does [your] company 
allocate responsibility for the management of climate-related risks?  If 
so, how does it do so?”; (2) “Is there a committee of independent 
board members addressing the issues?”; (3) “What progress, if any, has 
a company made in quantifying, disclosing, and/or reporting its emis-
sions profile?”; and (4) “How well has a company planned for future 
92 Id. at 10-13. 
93 Kenneth E. Anderson & Donna Ferrara, Disclosing Environmental Liabilities:  Direc-
tor, Officer, and Insurance Issues, 16 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 3, 11 (2004). 
94 E-mails from Swiss Re (Nov. 23 & 24, 2006) (on file with authors). 
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regulatory scenarios?” 95  Corporate directors have the duty to provide 
“good and prudent management” to the corporations they serve, and 
liability could thus arise from inaction of a corporate board where 
prudence dictates that action be taken.96
C.  Mitigation of Future Damage from Climate Change 
What can companies do to manage their climate change risks to-
day?  As one commentator notes: 
In contrast to claims seeking recovery for future damages, sea-level rise 
plaintiffs appear to have much stronger claims based on the present costs 
of preventing future harms.  The general tort rule is that plaintiffs who 
are harmed by defendants are entitled to recover their reasonable ex-
penditures needed to abate, mitigate, or prevent future recurrences of 
those harms. . . . [c]ourts have held that plaintiffs can recover from de-
fendants their reasonable expenditures for erecting walls to keep water 
off their property.
97
Insurance can and does play a key role in encouraging mitigation 
actions that reduce the impact of future climate change.  For exam-
ple, Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company is providing 5% rate credits 
to building owners who utilize solar panels, green roofs, and recycled 
water supply systems “[b]ecause green buildings are proven to be less 
prone to water damage, electrical fires, or full loss due to fire . . . .” 98  
Traveler’s Auto Insurance also offers a “10% discount on auto insur-
ance to drivers of hybrid-electric vehicles.” 99  American International 
Group (AIG) is also actively seeking to incorporate environmental 
and climate change considerations across its businesses, focusing on 
the development of products and services to help AIG and its clients 
respond to the worldwide drive to cut GHG emissions.100
Mills and Lecomte point out that the U.S. Department of Energy 
catalogued “nearly 80 technologies and practices . . . that can lower 
greenhouse gas emissions while reducing the direct risk of property 
damage from mechanical equipment breakdown, professional liabil-
ity, builders’ risk, business interruption, and occupational health and 
95 Marsh Inc., Climate Change:  Business Risks and Solutions, RISK ALERT 23 (2006), 
available at http://solutions.marsh.com/climates/. 
96 Healy & Tapick, supra note 77, at 102-03. 
97 Grossman, supra note 80, at 17-18 (citations omitted). 
98 ALLIANZ GROUP & WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, CLIMATE CHANGE AND INSURANCE:  
AN AGENDA FOR ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (2006).
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 33. 
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safety.” 101  For example, energy-efficient lighting fixtures often give off 
less heat, thus reducing fire hazards.102  Facility-integrated solar power 
systems can also help a firm avoid business interruptions following 
outages on its electricity grid.103  Energy-efficient windows can likewise 
reduce energy losses by half or more and are more resistant to break-
age by windstorms.104
An example of a green building actually reducing losses is the 
“Harmony Resort on the island of St. John, which weathered Hurri-
canes Marilyn, Bertha, Georges, and Lenny with no loss of (solar) 
power or (solar) hot water, while operations on other facilities on the 
islands were disrupted for weeks or months.” 105
VI.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Despite the overwhelming scientific evidence that global warming 
is real, there is still considerable uncertainty as to its impact on 
weather-related disasters such as hurricanes, storms, and floods.  A 
look at the data on past losses from large-scale natural disasters indi-
cates that many of the most costly events in history have occurred in 
recent years.  There are several causes of this increased damage, most 
notably the large-scale development in coastal areas of the United 
States.  There has also been a lively debate by scientists as to whether 
warming sea surface temperatures are a cause of the increased inten-
sity and frequency of hurricanes.  Today, some insurers feel that the 
risks from hurricanes and other weather-related events in certain ar-
eas are uninsurable by the private sector alone due to the large catas-
trophic losses of recent years and the impact of global warming on 
weather patterns. 
Extreme events pose challenges for insurers because there is con-
siderable ambiguity associated with the probability of such an event 
occurring, and because insurers’ losses are often highly correlated 
with such events.  Catastrophe models and exceedance probability 
(EP) curves are useful decision aids for determining risk exposure and 
whether extreme events, such as natural disasters, are insurable risks.  
Given the limited historical data on these low-probability events, it is 
necessary to supplement this information with scientific models.  One 
101 MILLS & LECOMTE, supra note 21, at 17 (citation omitted). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 20. 
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also needs to recognize that even after utilizing the outputs from 
catastrophic models, there is considerable uncertainty in estimates of 
the likelihood and consequences of specific events. 
Based on a thorough study of the insurance claims from the 2004 
and 2005 hurricanes that hit Florida and other Gulf Coast states, 
modeling firms have revised the underlying assumptions used to esti-
mate the economic damage and insured losses from future catastro-
phes.  With these new models, the same insurance portfolio today 
would be considered much more risky than it was a year ago.  Rating 
agencies have also modified their rating methodologies in recent 
years by incorporating catastrophe exposures of insurers as an integral 
part of the analysis.  In addition, investors are now requiring a higher 
return on equity from insurers and reinsurers because of the per-
ceived increased volatility of their portfolios.  These other stake-
holders have forced insurers to focus attention on their underwriting 
decisions in risky areas and improve their exposure management 
strategy.  This is the new catastrophe risk management. 
In addition, there is a growing concern that lawsuits may be filed 
against firms for not taking appropriate action to reduce their GHG 
emissions or other pollutants that could cause global warming.  We 
expect that insurers will be more concerned with providing D&O li-
ability coverage to firms that they believe are not behaving responsibly 
in this area.  On a more positive note, some insurers are encouraging 
firms, through premium discount offers, to take positive measures to 
reduce climate change that also have short-term benefits, including 
damage mitigation against disaster. 
A better understanding and quantification of the different factors 
causing the increase over the last few years in economic losses due to 
major catastrophes will be critical to defining better strategies for pri-
vate companies and implementing more effective public policies to 
deal with future disasters, such as land use regulation, mitigation 
standards, and well-enforced building codes.  To help in that process, 
the insurance industry, partnering with government and international 
organizations (e.g., the OECD, United Nations, World Meteorological 
Organization, World Health Organization, and World Bank) might 
develop standardized data collection processes at a more granular 
level than what is currently done.106  These datasets should be made 
available to the public as well as to the research community. 
106 For a discussion on the data quality challenge, see, for example, Eberhard 
Faust, Peter Höppe, Angelika Wirtz & Silvio Schmidt, Trends in Natural Catastrophes—
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Today, data collection methods differ from one country to an-
other, and the quality of this information is heterogeneous.  At least 
two standardized international databases should be developed:  his-
torical loss data for all type and size of disasters,107 and data on insur-
ance market penetration (who is and is not covered).  These databases 
are likely to suggest ways that insurance coupled with other policy 
tools can reduce the risks associated with climate change, while pro-
viding the financial resources to aid the recovery process when the 
next large-scale disaster occurs. 
If insurers and reinsurers conclude that some climate-related risks 
have a high enough potential for causing catastrophic losses in spe-
cific areas, they will not want to continue offering coverage unless they 
are required by law to do so.  This raises the following policy questions 
that go beyond the scope of this Article:  Should insurance be re-
quired in certain highly hazard-prone areas?  If so, will the private sec-
tor be able to provide this coverage alone or will some type of public-
private partnership be necessary?  Should land use regulation restrict 
new construction in highly hazard-prone areas?  Can building codes 
be better designed and enforced?  Do certain regulations negatively 
impact the operation of private insurance and reinsurance markets?  
There is also the equity issue:  how should we deal with individuals 
who have been living in high-hazard areas for some time but cannot 
afford to pay for higher insurance premiums that reflect the new risk 
assessment? 
These and other questions are currently being addressed in detail 
in a complementary study undertaken by the Wharton Risk Center in 
conjunction with Georgia State University and the Insurance Informa-
tion Institute, and in partnership with over fifteen large insurers, rein-
surers, their trade associations, financial institutions, and other stake-
holders from the private and public sectors interested in these critical 
issues. 
Potential Role of Climate Change, in WORKSHOP ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISASTER 
LOSSES:  UNDERSTANDING AND ATTRIBUTING TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS, supra note 24, 
at 89, 89. 
107 Swiss Re, Munich Re, and Leuven University have developed time series on 
some disaster data, but they differ in their scope and are usually not public informa-
tion.  Workshop Summary Report, in WORKSHOP ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISASTER 
LOSSES:  UNDERSTANDING AND ATTRIBUTING TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS, supra note 24, 
at 4, 5. 
